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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
"It is well settled under Utah law [that] an order denying relief under [r]ule 60(b) is 
a final appealable order." Galaxy Silver & Crystal Partnership v. Richard Stone, etal., 2006 
Ut. App. 414; 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 467; Case No. 20060705-CA: October 13, 2006 
(quoting Arnica Mut Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-
3(2)Q. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Appellee agrees with Appellant that the only issue on appeal is the propriety of the 
trial court's denial of the U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) motion, and the standard of review is "abuse 
of discretion." Franklin Covey Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2 P.3d 451, 454 (Utah App. 2000). 
RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
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order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule 
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve 
a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 29, 2001, a vehicle driven by Plaintiff collided into a vehicle driven by 
Defendant, Thomas Sprague. Plaintiff claimed personal injury resulting from this motor 
vehicle accident. On August 7, 2003 Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking to adjudicate his 
personal injury claims. The defense theory was that Plaintiff sustained no injury in the 
subject accident. Specifically, the defense put on significant and compelling evidence that 
all of Plaintiff s claimed injuries either pre-existed this accident or arose significantly after 
the subject accident. The matter was tried to a jury on April 11 through 13, 2006. The jury 
agreed with the defense position and returned a verdict that Defendant Sprague was 
negligent, but that Plaintiff was not injured in the accident. Plaintiff appealed. 
The only issue raised by Plaintiffs appellate brief was "[w]hether the trial court erred 
when it failed to grant plaintiffs Motion of Plaintiff to be Relieved of the Court's 
Suppression Order and to allow Plaintiff to Supplement his Interrogatory Responses and 
other Discovery Requests." (Brief of Appellant at 1). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The accident which forms the basis for this lawsuit occurred on June 29, 2001. (R. 
at 2, If 7). 
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2. The Complaint was filed on August 27, 2003. (R. at 1). 
3. After the Complaint was filed, one of the defendants, Sean Higham, filed bankruptcy. 
As a result, this matter was put on hold while that matter was resolved. (R. at 14-15). 
4. On March 23,2004, the parties filed a Stipulated Discovery Plan and Order which set 
forth the applicable dates for discovery and for designation of witnesses. (R. at 16-22). 
5. The Stipulated Discovery Plan required the parties to produce Initial Disclosures by 
February 18, 2004. (R. at 2, lj 1(A). 
6. The Stipulated Discovery Plan was signed by Plaintiffs counsel and by Judge Barrett. 
(R.at21). 
7. Plaintiff did not file Initial Disclosures. (Appellant's Brief at 4, ]f 4(a) (citing R. at 
294-311)). 
8. The Stipulated Discovery Plan stated: 
Initial Disclosures: The parties are to exchange the information required by Rule 
26(a)(1) by February 18, 2004. These disclosures shall include: 
a. The name and, if know, the address and telephone number of each 
individual likely to have discoverable information supports [sic] the 
claims or defenses of a party, unless solely for impeachment, 
identifying the subjects of the information. 
b. A copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable 
documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, 
custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless 
solely for impeachment; 
c. A computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing 
party, making available for inspection and copying as under rule 34 all 
discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which such 
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and 
extent of injuries suffered. 
* * * 
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(R. at 17-185H 1(A)(1), (2), & (3). 
9. The Stipulated Discovery Plan stated: 
Pretrial Disclosures: the parties are to exchange pretrial disclosures required 
by Rule 26(a)(4) Thirty (30) days before trial. These disclosures shall include: 
1. The name and, if not previously provided, the address and 
telephone number of each witness, separately identifying 
witnesses the party expect [sic] to present and witnesses the 
party may call if the need arises. 
2. The designations of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be 
presented by means of a deposition and if not taken 
stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of the 
deposition testimony; and 
3. An appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, 
including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying 
those which the party expects to offer and those which the party 
may offer if the need arises. (R. at 18, If 1(B)(1), (2), and (3)). 
10. The Stipulated Discovery Plan stated that Plaintiff was required to designate lay 
witnesses by February 18, 2004. (R. at 19, % 2(C)(1)). 
11. The Stipulated Discovery Plan stated that Plaintiff was required to provide defendant 
the names of expert witnesses Plaintiff intended to call at trial by no later than July 2, 2004. 
(R. at 19-20, f 3(A)). 
12. The Stipulated Discovery Plan stated that expert depositions were to be completed by 
no later than August 16, 2004. (R. at 20, f^ 3(D)). 
13. On May 11, 2004 Defendant submitted Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories to 
Plaintiff, Defendant's First Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff. (R. at 24). 
14. Plaintiff answered interrogatories, but did not supplement them. (Appellant's Brief 
at 4, If 4(b) (citing R. at 294-311)). 
8 
15. In plaintiffs answers to interrogatories, he identified only one trial witness, Dr. 
Robert Rothfeder. (Appellant's Brief at 5, % 4(c) (citing R. at 294-295)). 
16. Plaintiff did not produce any documents during the course of discovery; rather, he 
produced limited documents prior to litigation to defendant's insurance carrier. (Appellant's 
Brief at 5, If 4(e) (citing R. at 295-295)). 
17. The only documents that were produced in this case were produced by defendant and 
his attorney. (Appellant's Brief at 5, ^  4(f) (citing R. at 294-295)). 
18. Plaintiff wholly failed to respond to defendant's request for production of documents. 
(Appellant's Brief at 5, ^  4(h) (citing R. at 294-295)). 
19. On June 22, 2004 the parties submitted a Stipulated Amended Discovery Plan and 
Order. (R. at 26). 
20. The Stipulated Amended Discovery Plan and Order was signed by Plaintiffs attorney 
on June 16, 2004. (R. at 29). 
21. Judge Barrett signed the Stipulated Amended Discovery Plan and Order on June 23, 
2004. (R. at 30). 
22. The Stipulated Amended Discovery Plan gave the parties until June 25, 2004, to file 
Initial Disclosures. (R. at 27, f 1(A)). 
23. The Stipulated Amended Discovery Plan included a paragraph requiring the parties 
to file Pre Trial Disclosures thirty (30) days before trial. (R. at 27,11(B)). 
24. The Stipulated Amended Discovery Plan modified the dates for discovery from the 
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original Stipulated Discovery Plan. The relevant dates were: 
1. Plaintiff would designate lay witnesses by July 15, 2004. 
2. Plaintiff would provide expert reports as required by Rule 26(a)(3) by no later 
than November 15, 2004. (R. at 28, % 1(A), (B), (D); ^  11(A)). 
25. On October 18, 2004, Plaintiff submitted Plaintiffs Response to First Set of 
Interrogatories from Defendant. (R. at 44-52). 
26. On December 15, 2004, a Stipulation to Amend Case Management Order was filed 
with the Court at which time counsel, Bruce Burt, made his first appearance as counsel for 
the defense. (R. at 53). 
27. On December 16,2004, the Amended Case Management Order was filed. (R. at 53). 
28. The Amended Case Management Order gave Plaintiff additional time to designate 
experts and provide reports. (R. at 53, f^ 1). 
29. On June 21, 2005, Defendant filed Defendant Sprague's Designation of Expert 
Witnesses. (R. at 94). 
30. On June 21, 2005, a Certificate of Readiness for Trial was filed by the defense with 
no objection from Plaintiff. (R. at 92). 
31. On July 27, 2005, the Court sent a Notice of Scheduling Conference to the parties. 
(R. at 165-167). 
32. After a continuance, a scheduling conference was set for August 1, 2005 and again 
on August 4, 2005. (R. at 178 - 180). 
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33. Defendant was not able to locate a minute entry or other record evidence of the 2005 
scheduling conference. 
34. On November 16,2005, Defendant filed Defendant's Designation of Trial Witnesses. 
(R. at 181). 
35. On or about November 16,2005, Defendant filed Defendant's Pre-Trial Disclosures. 
(R. at 183). 
36. Defendant's Motion in Limine and Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
in Limine were hand-delivered to Plaintiffs counsel on November 8,2005. (R. at 188,198). 
37. Defendant's Pretrial Disclosures were hand-delivered to Plaintiffs counsel on 
November 8, 2005. (R. at 186). 
38. In Defendant's Motion in Limine, Defendant requested, among other things not in 
dispute on appeal: (a) that Plaintiff be precluded from offering documents at trial that were 
not produced or obtained during discovery, (b) that Plaintiff be precluded from calling 
witnesses at trial not previously identified, (c) that Dr. Dennis Wyman's trial testimony be 
limited to the content of his one medical record dated 8/20/2001, and (d) that Plaintiff be 
precluded from offering expert opinion evidence from other witnesses other than Dr. 
Wyman. (R. at 187 - 188, 191- 197). 
39. Plaintiff did not file a written opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine. 
(Appellant's Brief at 5, ^  i (citing R. at 187-198)). 
40. Despite the fact that Plaintiff did not file a written objection to Defendant's Motion 
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in Limine, the Court heard oral argument on the motion on December 2, 2005. (Id.; R. at 
202; Appellant's Brief at 5, ^  4(i) & (j). 
41. At oral argument, Counsel for Plaintiff presented his oral objections to Defendant's 
Motion in Limine. (R. at 202). 
42. Trial was set to begin on December 6th and run through the #,2005. (R. at 183,209, 
212,226). 
43. Prior to the hearing on December 2, 2005, Plaintiffs counsel—for the first time 
—presented to defense counsel his proposed trial witnesses which included four "before and 
after" witnesses (one of whom was prominent criminal defense attorney and cousin of 
Plaintiff, Mr. Ron Yengich), Dr. Dennis Wyman, Dr. Paul Winterton, and Euguene Hawkins, 
D.C. (Appellant's Brief at 6, Tf 4(1); R. at 294-295)). 
44. The Court, after hearing oral argument from both attorneys, granted Defendant's 
Motion in Limine in its entirety. (R. at 202 - 209). 
45. The Order on Defendant's Motion in Limine stated the following: 
1. Plaintiff never filed Initial Disclosures. Plaintiff never calculated his lost wage 
claim, either in Initial Disclosures or in Supplemental Responses to 
Interrogatories. (R. at 204, ^ 4). 
2. Plaintiff was served with Defendant's First Request for Production of 
Documents to Plaintiff on or about May 11,2004 and Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not respond to request for production 
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of documents, but did respond to the interrogatory requests. No supplements 
were ever produced [to] either discovery request. (R. at 204, f^ 5). 
3. In Defendant's First Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, 
Defendant made the following requests: 
REQUEST NO. 1: Every medical bill or statement evidencing the 
medical expenses allegedly incurred by plaintiff as a result of the 
subject accident. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Every document evidencing plaintiffs damages, 
including any lost income. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Every document identified or referred to in 
plaintiffs Answers to Interrogatories. 
REQUEST NO. 6: All federal and state income tax returns, including 
Form W-2fs or Form 1099's, filed by plaintiff, either individually or 
jointly, for calendar years 1993 through 2003. 
Plaintiff did not respond or produce any documents responsive to these 
requests. 
4. Defendant requested all tax returns from Plaintiff and his attorney in Plaintiff s 
deposition. They were never produced. To date, no documents supporting 
Plaintiffs alleged lost wage claim have been produced to Defendant. 
5. Plaintiff did respond to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff. 
No supplements were provided. 
6. Plaintiff did not file Pre-Trial Disclosures as required by Rule 26 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
7. Defendant's Interrogatory No. 14 and Plaintiffs Response is as follows: 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify by date, title, subject matter and 
present custodian each document plaintiff intends to introduce into 
evidence at the trial in this matter. In lieu of providing this information, 
plaintiff may attach to his Answers to these Interrogatories all such 
documents. 
Response to Interrogatory No. 12: Plaintiff does not know all 
documents he intends on using at trial at this point. 
8. Based on Plaintiffs failure to supplement interrogatory responses, plaintiffs 
failure to file Initial Disclosures, Plaintiffs failure to file Pre-Trial 
Disclosures, and for all of the reasons set forth in Defendant's POINT V in the 
Memorandum in Support, Plaintiff is precluded from offering any documents 
at trial that were not produced or obtained during discovery. 
9. Based on the reasoning set forth in paragraph 12 and for all of the reasons 
stated in POINT V of the Memorandum in Support, Plaintiff is precluded from 
offering documents supporting medical expenses that were not obtained or 
produced during discovery. 
10. Plaintiff will be allowed to call Dr. Dennis Wyman, Dr. Paul Winterton, and 
Eugene Hawkins, D.C. at trial; however, based on all of the reasons stated in 
Defendant's POINT VI and POINT VII, the scope of that testimony will be 
limited to the contents of their medical reports. Plaintiff did not provide Expert 
Disclosures as required by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
neither did Plaintiff produce Pre-Trial Disclosures. 
11. Defendant is entitled to know what opinions Plaintiffs doctors will offer at 
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trial and the only information about their expected opinion testimony is found 
in their medical records. Defendant's expert is also entitled to know what 
opinions Plaintiffs doctors will offer at trial, but because no reports other than 
the medical records were produced, Defendant's expert will not be prepared 
to rebut or refute additional opinions not previously stated in the medical 
records. 
Regarding Defendant's POINT VIII, Defendant conceded that Plaintiff could 
call Dr. Winterton and Dr. Hawkins, but the scope of their testimony will be 
limited to the information found in their medical records for the reasons set 
forth in the paragraphs above and in the Memorandum in Support. 
Plaintiff will allowed to call one or two "before and after" witnesses. On 
December 2, 2005 Plaintiff produced to defense counsel a list of trial 
witnesses. That designation included four "before and after" witnesses. One 
of those witnesses is prominent criminal defense attorney, Ron Yengich. 
Defendant had no objection to Plaintiff calling one or two of these "before and 
after" witnesses, but Defendant did object to Mr. Ron Yengich. Defendant's 
concern was that if he had known that such a prominent attorney would be 
called to testify, that this witness may have been interviewed or deposed prior 
to trial. Further, Defendant objected to calling so many witnesses that will 
essentially be offering the same type of testimony on the ground that it will be 
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cumulative and repetitive. 
14. The Court, after considering the arguments from counsel and after considering 
Plaintiffs failure to identify trial witnesses until December 2, 2005, will 
exclude Mr. Ron Yengich from testifying at trial. Defendant was entitled to 
more advanced notice of these witnesses so he could adequately prepare for 
trial. The Court further finds that the effect of having 4 "before and after" 
witnesses will be that the evidence will be cumulative and repetitive. 
15. Plaintiff is precluded from offering a lost wage claim. Plaintiff has not 
produced any documents that support the claimed wage loss despite the 
interrogatory requests, the request for production of documents, and the 
request made by defense counsel in deposition of Plaintiff. Plaintiffs wage 
claim is totally unsupported by any documents and will amount to speculation 
if given to the jury. Thus, based on these reasons and all reasons stated in 
POINT IX in the Memorandum in Support, Plaintiff is precluded from 
asserting a lost wage claim at trial. 
46. In the lower court, Plaintiffs counsel told the Court he had tried approximately one 
dozen personal injury cases and that, in his experience, motions in limine were generally filed 
and heard on the day of trial. (R. at 271). 
47. In the lower court, Plaintiffs counsel argued that he was "surprised" when at the 
December 2, 2005, hearing on the Defendant's Motion in Limine, the defense asserted that 
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Plaintiff had not responded in writing to the motion. (R. at 272). 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defense counsel has no objection to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts, paragraphs 1, 2, 
3, 4(a)-(l)5 5, & 6. In fact, it appears that these statement are taken primarily from 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to be Relieved of the 
Court's Suppression Order and to Allow Plaintiff to Supplement his Discovery 
Responses. (R. at 294 - 311). However, paragraphs 4(m), (n), and (o) do not have 
support in the appellate record. 
2. Plaintiffs counsel informed defense counsel at least three months prior to trial that 
he intended on calling on most, if not all, of plaintiff s treating physicians to testify 
in this matter. (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294 - 311). 
Response: This is paragraph 4(m) of Plaintiffs Statement of Facts. Plaintiffs 
Citation to the Record, pp. 294 - 311, does not support this "Statement of Fact." 
Further, Defendant's review of the record does not reveal that Plaintiff identified any 
trial witnesses (except Dr. Dennis Wyman) at any time before trial. Further, Plaintiff 
admits that he did not file Pretrial Disclosures, that he did not file expert witness 
designation or provide expert witness reports, and that he only identified one trial 
witness1 in his answers to interrogatories. No record evidence supports this statement. 
*In answers to interrogatories, Plaintiff identified just one trial witness, Dr. Robert 
Rothfeder. (Appellant Brief at 5, f 4(c); R. at 295, % 3). In point of fact, Plaintiff never treated 
with Dr. Rothfeder. Rather, Plaintiff treated with Dr. Rothfeder's partner, Dr. Dennis Wyman. 
The Defense acknowledged this apparent clerical error. (R. at 194, FN 1). In fact, the defense 
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Plaintiff's counsel informed defense counsel that he intended on calling three or four 
ubefore or after " witnesses. (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294 - 295). 
Response: This paragraph 4(n) of Plaintiff s Statement of Facts. Plaintiffs Citation 
to the Record, pp. 294-311, does not support this "Statement of Fact." Further, 
Defendant's review of the record does not reveal that Plaintiff provided the identity 
of these "before and after" witnesses at anytime before 12/2/2005—just 4 days before 
trial was set to begin. (Appellant's Brief at 6, lj 4; R. at 183,209,212, 226). Further, 
Plaintiff admits that he did not file Pretrial Disclosures, and that he only identified one 
trial witness (i.e. Dr. Robert Rothfeder) in his answers to interrogatories. There is no 
record evidence to support Plaintiffs statement in paragraph 4(n). 
At no time did defense counsel inform plaintiff's counsel that defense counsel intended 
on moving to exclude the testimony based on the fact that they had, not prior to that 
time, been disclosed. (Record on Appeal, pp. 269-271). 
Response: This "Statement of Fact" is supported by reference to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Support of Motion of Plaintiff to be Relieved of the Court's 
Suppression Order and to Allow Plaintiff to Supplement His Discovery Responses. 
(R. at 269 - 271). This was an argument raised by Plaintiffs counsel in the lower 
court and is not appropriate as a "Statement of Fact." 
conceded that even though Dr. Wyman was not specifically identified as a trial witness, that 
Plaintiff could call Dr. Wyman at trial so long as his testimony was limited to the content of his 
one medical report of 8/20/2001 . (R. at 194, 204-205). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It does not constitute "surprise" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) that a 
trial court would exclude certain testimony after Plaintiff repeatedly disregarded discovery 
rules and Defendant filed a motion in limine—especially when such testimony was not 
disclosed until shortly before trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, but instead 
complied with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
In this case, Plaintiff raises only one issue for appeal. He argues that the trial court 
abused its discretion when it refused to grant a Rule 60(b)(1) motion relieving Plaintiff from 
the Order on Defendant's Motion in Limine. (Appellant's Brief at 1). In the lower court, 
Plaintiff moved for relief from the Order on Defendant's Motion in Limine on the basis of 
"surprise" under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
An appeal of an order denying Rule 60(b)(1) relief is "limited to review of the ruling 
on the rule 60(b) motion and is not an appeal from the underlying judgment." Galaxy Silver 
& Crystal Partnership v. Richard Stone, et aL, 2006 Ut. App. 414; Case No. 20060705-CA: 
October 13, 2006; (citing Franklin Covey Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 Ut.App. 110, 2 P.3d 
451) (An appeal of a rule 60(b) order should address only the propriety of the denial of the 
60(b) motion and does not reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief is 
sought.) Thus, this Court must only address whether Judge Barrett abused discretion when 
he denied Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion and whether Plaintiff has shown "surprise." 
19 
Plaintiff/Appellant Andy Rukavina states that "[n]o Utah case interprets or describes 
the necessary conditions for the 'surprise' element" of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)( 1). 
(Brief of Appellant at 7). While the defense agrees that Utah case law on "surprise" under 
Rule 60(b)(1) is limited, there are a few cases that have addressed this issue. 
In MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Williams, (2006 UT App 369,20060073-CA, Sept. 
8, 2006) the Utah Court of Appeals considered "unfair surprise" and "excusable neglect." 
The standard set in MBNA for "surprise" appears to be something that cannot reasonably be 
anticipated. For example, if there is no service of a filing upon an entity, that entity is validly 
"surprised" by a requirement to respond to the filing of which it had no notice. 
The Utah Court of Appeals examined a claim of "surprise" very similar to the present 
appeal in Bliss v. Sky High Incorporated (2002 UT App 255, 20010299-CA, Aug. 1,2002). 
In that case, a party participated in arbitration, was served with the arbitrator' s ruling, did not 
file motion to vacate, and then claimed surprise when the trial court confirmed the arbitration 
award. The Court of Appeals rejected the "surprise" argument and affirmed the trial court's 
use of its discretion. 
Plaintiff/ Appellant concedes in his brief that 60(b)(1) relief can only be granted for 
a claim of excusable neglect "if the attorney has acted with diligence." It appears clear that 
Plaintiff s counsel did not act with diligence given that all Rule 26(a) disclosure requirements 
were ignored, requests for production of documents were ignored, interrogatories were 
answered but not supplemented, and crucial information (such as the identity of trial 
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witnesses) was never provided, etc. Thus, "excusable neglect" cannot be shown. This 
leaves Plaintiff and his attorney just one other argument under Rule 60(b), i.e. "surprise." 
Plaintiff argues that because the Utah Appellate cases are silent on the meaning of "surprise" 
in their published opinions, "surprise" should be analyzed without considering attorney 
diligence. However, cases interpreting rules similar to Utah's disagree and, in fact, do 
consider attorney diligence when analyzing "surprise." 
Utah's Rule 60(b) is very similar to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In fact, the four bases of 60(b)(1) are identical. In Bituminous Casualty Corp. 
v. Garcia, 223 F.R.D. 308 (N.D.Tex. 2004), the question was what constituted "surprise" 
under F.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). The court noted that its limited research showed no extensive 
jurisprudence interpreting "surprise." Id. at 312. The court included a list of holdings 
interpreting "surprise." Id. fn. 6. The court stated: 
Those cases the Court found do not engage in any analysis of "surprise," but 
simply apply the ordinary meaning of the word to their facts. In a plain 
meaning sense, Intervenors' discovery of the pendency of this action and 
default judgment against them surely was a surprise. The Court therefore 
holds that Intervenors' claim fits within the ambit of Rule 60(b)(1). 
Id. at 312-313. 
One factor the Bituminous Court considered was the negligence or carelessness of the 
parties arguing surprise. A plain meaning of "surprise" suggests something that cannot be 
guarded against, that a reasonable person cannot foresee. Black's Law Dictionary defines 
surprise, interestingly enough, in the context of Rule 60(b): 
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Act of taking unawares; sudden confusion or perplexity. In its legal 
acceptance, denotes an unforeseen disappointment against which ordinary 
prudence would not have afforded protection. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding because of 
surprise. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). 
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, 1443. The dictionary definition is consistent with the 
Bituminous court which said: 
[t]he default here took place without any notice to Intervenors, without any 
negligence or carelessness by Intervenors, not as a result of any ignorance of 
the law on the part of Intervenors or their attorneys, was not a result of an 
intentional choice by Interventors, and the instant motion is not made in lieu 
of an appeal. 
Id, at 313. 
Conversely, Plaintiff in the present appeal disregarded his obligations under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, despite the consequences in Rule 37. That those consequences 
were levied should have been no "surprise." It is the Defendant's position that "surprise" 
analysis should include examination of attorney diligence because, by definition, it means 
an event that is "unforeseeable." Certainly, the consequences of Rule 37 were foreseeable. 
In Ilardi v. Bechtel Power Corp., 106 F.R.D. 567, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), the court 
noted that "[b]y now, it is hornbook law that' [n]either ignorance nor carelessness on the part 
of a litigant or his attorney will provide grounds for rule 60(b) relief" (quoting Bershadv. 
McDonougK 469 F.2d 1333,1337 (7th Cir. 1972)). The Ilardi Court refused to condone the 
evidentiary failings of the plaintiffs counsel that resulted in the barring of portions of 
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testimony from a certain witness, and a refusal to receive a document as evidence for failure 
to lay foundation. "The court is convinced of the correctness of these rulings and finds that 
neither could have come as a surprise to counsel." 106 F.R.D. at 570. 
Other states similarly require more than the simple assertion by a moving party that 
a ruling came as a surprise. Arizona, following New Mexico's lead, looks for a showing of 
"exceptional circumstances." Lopez-Hudson v. Schneider, 937 P.2d 329, 332 (Ariz.App. 
Div. 1 1996). Missouri states that "the surprise must be something unexpected, as to which 
the party is free of neglect or lack or prudence." Levine v. Hans, 923 S.W.2d 357, 362 
(Mo.App. W.D. 1996)(citations omitted). "A showing of exceptional circumstances is 
required to obtain relief from judgment on the basis of surprise." AmJur2d\ Judgments § 687 
Surprise (2006). In this case, Plaintiff has not shown "exceptional circumstances." Plaintiff 
has not shown that the result was or should have been "unexpected, as to which the party is 
free of neglect. . . ." 
Plaintiffs appeal is inconsistent on its face. He requests relief from the Court's order 
on Defendant's Motion in Limine on the basis of "surprise." He claims that the Court's order 
surprised him. However, the Court merely granted the relief requested by Defendant in the 
motion in limine for the reasons stated in the motion. Plaintiff filed no response to that 
motion. The Plaintiff knew the requested relief and factual basis for the relief and made no 
meaningful opposition. That the Court could grant the relief should come as no surprise. 
Additionally, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure support the trial court's actions in 
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excluding and/or limiting certain evidence. Plaintiff could have no reasonable expectation 
that he could disregard nearly all applicable rules of civil procedure without consequence. 
The rules of civil procedure are designed to prevent surprise. Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 
39,40; 19 Utah 2d 189, 190 (Utah 1967). Plaintiff attempted to introduce witnesses and 
experts who had not been previously identified just days before the scheduled trial. Such 
designations, after the close of discovery, when Defendant had no opportunity to depose or 
investigate the new testimony would have constituted unfair surprise to the Defendant. 
Plaintiff is left in the logically inconsistent position of arguing that the Court unfairly 
surprised him by not allowing him to unfairly surprise the Defendant. The appeal should be 
dismissed. 
In addition to showing that he was "surprised," Plaintiff must show that Judge Barrett 
abused his discretion by not granting the Rule 60(b) motion. Trial courts have broad 
discretion in matters of discovery. See Green v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638,648 (Utah 2001). uAn 
appellate court will not find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or 
where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling." Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
held in Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110, 1117 (Utah 2000), 
[t]rial courts are given broad discretion regarding the imposition of discovery 
sanctions because it is they that must deal first hand with the parties and the 
discovery process. We will interfere only if an abuse of discretion is clearly 
shown. Persistent dilatory tactics that frustrate the judicial process are 
adequate to trigger rule 37 sanction, and the choice of the appropriate 
sanctions is within the trial judge's discretion. 
(Citations omitted). In this case, the trial court's denial of Plaintiff s Rule 60(b) motion was 
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reasonable, based on significant discovery abuses and was based on his perception of those 
discovery abuses, and is well supported in the record. 
Defendant will now address the specific allegations raised in Brief of Appellant. 
1. ALLEGED CALIFORNIA MOTION PRACTICE IS NOT A BASIS FOR 
"SURPRISE" 
Plaintiffs attorney claims to have practiced law in California before coming to Utah. 
He claims that motion in limine practice in California is different than in Utah and that 
motions in limine are typically filed and argued on the first day of trial. It appears to be 
Plaintiffs argument that because of this difference, he was "surprised" when the Court 
granted the defense motion in limine; he was "surprised" that, in part, the motion was granted 
based on his failure to file a written opposition. (Appellant's Brief at 8, 10). This argument 
lacks merit and does not constitute "surprise," nor does it show an abuse of discretion. 
The first problem with this argument is that this stated California practice was, in fact, 
substantially followed in this case. That is, Judge Barrett allowed Plaintiff to raise arguments 
and to object to the motion in limine at the December 2,2005, hearing. Thus, reliance on the 
California practice/procedure to show "surprise" or abuse of discretion is misguided. 
Second, Plaintiff cannot reasonably argue that this result was "unexpected" or 
"unforeseen" given the specific relief sought in Defendant's Motion in Limine and 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine. Plaintiff knew exactly what the 
defense was doing at least 30 days before trial. Thus, he was not "surprised" when the court 
granted that request. 
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Further, the Court's ruling on Defendant's Motion in Limine was not based entirely 
on the fact that Plaintiff did not file a written objection. While that may have been one 
consideration, the basis of the Court's ruling was multi-factorial, including Plaintiffs 
complete failure to respond to requests for production of documents, for failure to 
supplement interrogatory answers, for failure to file required pre-trial disclosures, for failure 
to file expert witness designations, etc. (See R. at 203 - 208). 
As an additional basis, Plaintiffs attorney cannot reasonably argue "surprise" based 
on a lack of knowledge of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs attorney has been 
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah since 1998. (R. at 306). By filing a civil 
lawsuit, he knows or should know the applicable rules of civil procedure. He cannot 
legitimately argue "surprise" when the Court chooses to enforce those rules. Ignorance of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be a valid defense of "surprise" under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Further, even if this argument was valid, it does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. 
Judge Barrett, in exercising his discretion, had authority under multiple rules of civil 
procedure to grant the requested relief. 
Plaintiffs attorney—by his own admission in the Brief of Appellant—ignored nearly 
every disclosure requirement in Rule 26. He did not file Initial Disclosures, he wholly failed 
to respond to requests for production of documents, and he only provided limited answers 
to interrogatories. He failed to file expert disclosures and did not provide expert reports. He 
failed to file the pretrial disclosures. Despite these failings, Plaintiff now complains that the 
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trial court abused its discretion when it did not allow Mr. Ron Yengich to testify as a "before 
and after" witness. However, if Plaintiff intended to call him as a trial witness, he should 
have identified Mr. Yengich more than 4 days before trial. Plaintiff had a second opportunity 
to identify Mr. Yengich in answers to interrogatories, but again he did not identify him. In 
point of fact, Plaintiffs attorney identified all "before and after" witnesses, for the first time, 
on December 2, 2005. 
Finally, as the defense argued in the lower court, calling four "before and after" 
witnesses would have been cumulative and repetitive. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it excluded Mr. Yengich from testifying at trial and Plaintiff has not set for 
any compelling arguments of abuse. Further, Plaintiff has not shown what Mr. Yengich 
would have said, let alone that his testimony would have influenced this jury to reach a 
different conclusion. 
Plaintiff also argues that Judge Barrett abused his discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) 
motion when he limited the testimony of the treating physicians. That argument, however, 
goes to the heart of the underlying motion in limine rather than the Rule 60(b) denial 
ostensibly appealed. Defendant responds to the extent the argument may relate to "surprise." 
In the first and second case management orders, Pretrial disclosures and expert 
witness disclosures were addressed. In the third case management order, Plaintiff was given 
a third opportunity to designate expert witnesses. Plaintiffs attorney signed all three of these 
orders. In the first two orders, it was made clear that Pretrial disclosures were required 30 
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days before trial. Despite this, Plaintiff did not file Pretrial disclosures. It was made clear 
in the third order (as well as the first two orders) that Plaintiff had an obligation to designate 
expert witnesses by a certain date, which he failed to do. The record is clear that Plaintiff 
never designated any trial witnesses with the exception of Dr. Robert Rothfeder. It is 
unreasonable for Plaintiff to now argue "surprise" when the Court limited the scope of the 
medical witnesses. In addition to having an obligation to know and adhere to the applicable 
rules of civil procedure, Plaintiffs attorney had actual knowledge of these disclosure 
requirements as seen by his signature on the three case management orders. Plaintiff was not 
"surprised," nor has he shown abuse of discretion on this issue. 
Another rule Plaintiff ignored during discovery was Rule 26(e), Supplementation of 
responses. In this case, Plaintiff answered interrogatories, but the only trial witness 
identified was Dr. Robert Rothfeder. Rule 26(e)(2) unambiguously requires a party to 
supplement disclosures and answers to interrogatories "seasonably." No supplements were 
ever produced by Plaintiff. Thus, when the Court excluded Mr. Yengich, limited the number 
of "before and after" witnesses, and limited the scope of the medical witnesses, the Court 
reasonably exercised its discretion. In fact, if the Court had allowed Plaintiff to present all 
of this never before disclosed testimony, it would have resulted in unfair surprise to the 
defense. 
In sum, under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiffs disregard of Rule 26(a) 
disclosure requirements and other dilatory discovery responses, Plaintiff cannot reasonably 
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argue "surprise." Plaintiff has not shown abuse of discretion; in fact, given the pattern of 
non-disclosure, it is the defense position that Judge Barrett exercised reasonable discretion 
in all disputed matters. 
2. A MOTION TO COMPEL IS NOT REQUIRED BEFORE LEVYING RULE 37 
SANCTIONS 
Plaintiff next argues "surprise" because the motion in limine was granted without 
Defendant first filing a motion to compel. (Appellant's Brief at 11). In other words, because 
Defendant did not first file a motion to compel Plaintiff to file Initial Disclosures, to answer 
requests for production of documents, to supplement interrogatory answers, to file Pretrial 
disclosures, and to file designation of expert witnesses, that Plaintiff was "reasonably 
surprised" when the Court excluded and limited evidence. Plaintiff had an affirmative duty 
under Rules 26(a) and (e), and Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
provide these disclosures. However, Defendant had no corresponding affirmative duty to 
present a Motion to Compel required disclosures. 
This argument also ignores Utah case law, case law cited by the defense in the court 
below (a copy of this case was attached as an appendix to Brief of Appellant). (See R. at 
299, FN 1; R. at 308 - 311). Plaintiffs counsel did not cite Coxey v. Fraternal Order of the 
Eagles, Aerie 2742, 112 P.3d 1244,1246 (Utah App. 2005). In Coxey, the Court made clear 
that a motion to compel is not required to bring sanctions into play under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(d). 
[R]ule 37(d) "allows a court to impose sanctions against a party for 
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disregarding discovery obligations even when that party has not directly 
violated a court order specifically compelling discovery." Schoney v. 
Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah Ct.App. 1990); see, e.g., W. W. 
& W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park W. Vill. Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 n.9 (Utah 1977) 
("'No court order is required to bring [r]ule 37(d) into play. It is enough that 
a notice of the taking of a deposition or a set of interrogatories or a request for 
inspection has been properly served on the party."* (citation omitted)). 
Coxey at 1246. This result is consistent with the language in Rule 37(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which states that a party "may apply for an order compelling discovery 
. . . . " (Emphasis added). A motion to compel is not required to bring Rule 37 sanctions into 
play. Failure to file a motion to compel required disclosures is not "surprise," nor does it 
show abuse of discretion. 
3. THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ALLOW A TRIAL COURT TO 
EXCLUDE OR LIMIT TESTIMONY 
Plaintiff argues that he was "surprised" because, he argues, the applicable rules of 
civil procedure do not allow the trial court to exclude or limit witnesses from testifying at 
trial. (Brief of Appellant at 10). Plaintiff apparently argues that Judge Barrett abused his 
discretion by limiting testimony and excluding witnesses. Plaintiff stated: 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does indicate that plaintiff is to 
disclose witnesses 30 days before trial. However, nothing in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, anywhere, suggests that the court will limit a parties' 
witnesses from testifying in the event that the disclosures are not complied 
with. 
Id. This statement is not accurate. Rule 37(f) reads: 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other 
material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rules 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior 
response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be 
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permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless 
the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure 
to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court may order any 
other sanction, including payment of reasonable costs and attorney's fees, any 
order permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury of 
the failure to disclose. 
The relevant Rule 26(a) disclosures include: (a)(1) Initial Disclosures, (a)(3) Disclosure of 
expert testimony, (a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. By Plaintiffs own admission, he did not file 
any of these disclosures. Further, Plaintiff admittedly did not supplement the interrogatory 
answers (i.e. he did not designate any other trial witnesses) as required by Rule 26(e). Thus, 
given that Plaintiff wholly failed to file Rule 26(a) disclosures and did not supplement 
discovery responses pursuant to Rule 26(e), the trial court acted reasonably when it refused 
to permit previously undisclosed witnesses from testifying at trial. The rule expressly 
provides that "the party shall not be permitted to use the witness" if that party fails to adhere 
to Rule 26(a) and Rule 26(e). Here, Plaintiff admittedly did not adhere to these rules. 
Plaintiffs counsel's statement, therefore, that there is nothing in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that allows the trial court from limiting testimony of undisclosed witnesses ignores 
Rule 37. 
Another basis for exclusion of the witnesses is Rule 16(d) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. That rule provides in relevant part: 
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or 
pretrial order . . . the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may make such 
orders with regard thereto as are just, among others, any of the orders provided 
in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu or in addition to any other sanctions, the 
court shall require the party or the attorney representing the party or both to 
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pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this 
rule, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the noncompliance was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
In this case, there were three case management orders, all signed by Plaintiffs attorney 
before Judge Barrett approved and signed them. Clearly, Plaintiff did not comply with the 
case management orders because he did not file required disclosures and cooperate in 
discovery. Rule 16(d) makes clear that the Court, on its own motion, may sanction a party 
for noncompliance with a case management order. Rules 37(b)(2)(B) specifically allows the 
court to issue "an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose 
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in 
evidence." Again, Plaintiffs counsel's statement that there is nothing in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure that allowed the trial court to exclude witnesses is inaccurate. 
In sum, Utah case law and the applicable rules of civil procedure do not require a 
motion to compel to bring Rule 37 sanctions into play. The applicable rules of civil 
procedure specifically authorize the trial court to exclude evidence if Rule 26(a) disclosures 
are not produced or if a party fails to comply with a case management order. Plaintiff failed 
to show "surprise" and failed to show that Judge Barrett abused discretion in denying 
Plaintiff s Rule 60(b) motion for relief. Judge Barrett's decision to deny Plaintiff Rule 60(b) 
motion was reasonable. 
4. THE LIMIT OF MEDICAL WITNESS TESTIMONY WAS REASONABLE 
Plaintiff argues that the Court's order limiting the scope of the medical witness 
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testimony at trial was "surprise." Plaintiff argues that Defense counsel knew who the treating 
physicians were, that he was told verbally at a pretrial conference that "treating physicians" 
would be called to testify. There are many problems with this argument. 
First, the Court allowed Dr. Winterton and Dr. Hawkins to testify despite the fact that 
they were never disclosed prior to December 2, 2005. Clearly, the Court could have 
excluded them entirely. In fact, Defense counsel told the Court that he had no objection to 
these physicians testifying at trial so long as their testimony was limited to the content of 
their medical records. This way, there would be no surprises for Defendant and his expert. 
Based on this concession, the Court, rather than excluding the witnesses, simply limited the 
scope of their testimony to the information contained in the medical records. Certainly, it 
would not have been unreasonable—under these circumstances—for the Court to entirely 
exclude them from testifying. 
Plaintiff argues that the defense constructively knew which witnesses would be called 
at trial because the defense knew "treating physicians" might be called to testify and based 
on a conversation in the courthouse hallway after the pretrial conference. (Appellant's Brief 
at 6, 11). Plaintiff stated: 
About three months prior to trial, at the final pre-trial conference, plaintiffs 
counsel informed defense counsel of the witnesses he intended to call; 
however, this was not done in writing. Nevertheless, defense counsel waited 
until the last possible moment to file a motion in limine objecting to witnesses 
he knew plaintiff was going to call. Plaintiffs counsel was surprised by the 
court's ruling limiting the testimony and excluding one of the witnesses, as 
indicated. 
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(Brief of Appellant at 11). 
There is no record evidence to support the existence or the content of this 
conversation. The implication that defense counsel knew—based on this alleged hallway 
conversation—the specific identities and content of Plaintiff s trial witnesses is not supported 
by the record. In point of fact, the record evidence refutes this allegation. The fact that the 
defense filed Defendant's Motion in Limine after the pretrial conference, is evidence that 
the defense did not know the specific identity or content of expert trial witnesses. That 
motion was hand-delivered to Plaintiff on November 8, 2005. (See R. at 188, 197). In the 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine, the defense specifically argued 
that Plaintiff should be precluded from calling witnesses he did not previously identify. (R. 
at 193-194). 
It is curious that Plaintiff suggests that the defense motion in limine was filed at the 
"last possible moment" in an attempt to somehow "surprise" him. The motion was filed 
contemporaneously with the defense Pretrial Disclosures and gave Plaintiff sufficient time 
to respond, in writing, to the motion. Further, there is no indication in the record or in 
Plaintiffs appellate brief that he did not receive the motion. Thus, there is no justification 
for ignoring it. This position is even more curious given Plaintiffs attorney's position that 
his "California" practice was to file and hear motions on the same day of trial. In this case, 
he had 30 days to prepare and respond to this motion rather than having to scramble on the 
morning of trial to address the issues. This argument lacks merit. 
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Regardless whether this "hallway conversation" occurred, it is not relevant. Plaintiff 
had an obligation to file written disclosures and he did not file them. While defense counsel 
knew which physicians treated Plaintiff, that is not the same as knowing which of those 
treating physicians would testify at trial. It is not the same as knowing what expert opinions 
those physicians would offer, and the bases for those opinions. It is not the same as knowing 
what the witnesses qualifications are, or knowing upon what information their opinions were 
based. It is not the same thing as knowing what fees the experts charge. Expert disclosures 
require specific information to be disclosed in discovery so the defense (and its experts) can 
properly prepare its case for trial. In this case, none of that information was provided and 
it was not unreasonable for Judge Barrett to limit the scope of the treating physicians' 
testimony. 
5. PLAINTIFF DID NOT CREATE AN APPELLATE RECORD THAT TREATING 
PHYSICIANS INTENDED TO OFFER HELPFUL EXPERT OPINIONS 
Throughout the body of Brief of Appellant, he argues that the exclusion of Ron 
Yengich and the limiting of the treating physicians' testimony was error because these 
witnesses would have helped prove his case. (Brief of Appellant at 3-4, 7, 10-11). It is the 
Defendant's position that the Court should not consider these arguments because the only 
issue raised on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant 
60(b) relief and whether Plaintiff showed surprise. To address these issues directly would 
be to address the merits of the underlying motion in limine. See Galaxy Silver & Crystal 
Partnership v. Richard Stone, et al., 2006 Ut. App. 414; Case No. 20060705-CA: October 
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13, 2006 (an appeal of an order denying 60(b) relief is limited to a review of the ruling on 
the 60(b) motion, and not on the underlying judgment or order). Thus, there should be no 
need to address these issues. Plaintiff has not shown clear abuse of discretion or surprise 
and, as a result, the Court's analysis need go no further. However, since Plaintiff raises these 
arguments, the defense will address them below. 
It should be pointed out that while Plaintiff was allowed to call Dr. Wyman and Dr. 
Hawkins, he did not call either witness at trial. His only trial witness was Dr. Paul Winterton. 
(See R. at 353-356). Plaintiff argues that his case was hurt because the court limited the 
scope of treating physicians' testimony. (Brief of Appellant at 4,7). This assertion is wholly 
unsupported and unsupportable. Plaintiff did not request any transcripts of the relevant 
hearings or trial. There is no way for this Court to determine whether there was an offer of 
proof made. There is no way to know what these physicians would have said had they been 
allowed to offer other opinions, or whether they truly intended to offer other opinions. 
The appellate court can see that Plaintiff did not call either Dr. Hawkins or Dr. 
Wyman, but there is no way to know whether these two physicians intended to offer 
"causation" opinions not found in their medical records. (See R. at 353-356). Dr. Winterton 
testified at trial, but because there is no transcript of the trial, there is no way to know 
whether Plaintiff made an offer of proof, or whether Dr. Winterton intended to offer 
"causation" or other expert opinions in addition to the information in the medical records. 
In Downey State Bank v. Major Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978) the Utah 
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Supreme Court stated: 
A judgment will not be reversed for an alleged error in the exclusion of 
evidence unless it appears in the record that the error was prejudicial. 
Ringwood's failure to make a proffer of proof as to what his evidence would 
show precludes him from asserting on appeal that the exclusion was error. 
Id. at 1288. See also Croasmun v. Advocate Publishing Co., dba High Desert Advocate, et 
al, 2000 Ut. App. 122, Case No. 990097-CA, May 4, 2000) ("Defendants adequately 
preserved this issue for appeal because they proffered the excluded, non-designated portions 
of the Brenneman deposition by reading it into the record. By contrast, defendants did not 
read into the record the excluded non-designated portions of Larry J. Peterson's deposition. 
Without that testimony in the record, it is impossible to evaluate whether its exclusion was 
prejudicial.") 
Plaintiffs failure to create a record and request relevant transcripts is a fatal flaw. 
The Court is now left with no method to determine whether Plaintiffs case was harmed as 
alleged or whether these physicians, in fact, intended to offer other opinions. 
Plaintiff stated: 
Neither plaintiff nor plaintiffs counsel were aware or put on notice of the fact 
that a draconian result would essentially robbing them of any chance of real 
victory in the case would be levied as a result of the failure [sic]. 
(Brief of Appellant at 11). As stated above, Plaintiff argues that denial of the 60(b) motion 
"robb[ed] them of any chance of real victory." (Id.) Plaintiff has presented no record 
evidence that the result would have been different if physicians had been allowed to offer 
more testimony. Plaintiffs failure to create a record or provide a record of excluded 
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testimony should preclude this court from considering this argument entirely. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant requests that the appeal be dismissed for all of the reasons stated above. 
DATED this _7_ day of May, 2007. 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, PAYNE & BURT, 
ys for Defendant/Appellee 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and 
Thorne. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Paul F. Bliss (Bliss) appeals the trial 
court's order confirming the arbitration 
award and the denial of his Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 
Sky High argues that Bliss's appeal is 
untimely. We affirm. 
We first determine that Bliss timely 
appealed because the trial court did not 
decide the issue of attorney fees sought 
by Sky High until April 25, 2001. A trial 
court "must determine the amount of 
attorney fees awardable to a party 
before the judgment becomes final for 
the purposes of an appeal under Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3." Promax 
Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, P 15, 
998 P.2d 254 ; see also Loffredo v. Holt, 
2001 UT97, P12, 37P.3d1070. 
Because the final order awarding 
attorney fees in this matter was not 
entered until April 25, 2001, Bliss's 
March 27, 2001 notice of appeal was 
timely filed. See Utah R. App. P. 4(c) 
(allowing a party to file its notice of 
appeal before the trial court enters its 
formal written order). 
Second, Bliss argues the trial court erred 
in confirming the arbitration award prior 
to expiration of the twenty-day time 
period specified in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-31a-12 (1996). He asserts he was 
prejudiced because he had no time to 
object to the arbitrator's award. We 
conclude that any error by the trial court 
in prematurely confirming the arbitration 
award was harmless. See Jones v. 
Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp., 944 P.2d 
357, 360 (Utah 1997) (stating harmless 
error where "no reasonable likelihood 
exists that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings"). Bliss had 
over twenty days to file a motion to 
vacate from the day the arbitrator's 
decision was served on him, but failed to 
do so. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-31a-14(2) (1996). Hence, even if the 
trial court had waited twenty days before 
granting the motion to confirm, Bliss 
had, by then, waived his right to move to 
vacate. Because the period to move to 
vacate the arbitration decision had 
expired before the trial confirmed that 
decision, Bliss could not have suffered 
the harm he now claims; thus, his 
argument fails. 
Bliss also argues that it was error to 
allow a Salt Lake County arbitrator to 
determine the validity of a mechanics' 
lien filed on property located in Juab 
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County. This argument lacks merit. Bliss 
cites no authority to support his 
argument. Furthermore, the parties 
contractually agreed to settle their 
disputes by arbitration, without 
specifying where it would occur. 
Additionally, the trial court ruled that the 
arbitrator should determine the 
appropriateness of the mechanics' lien 
and ultimately ordered release of the lien 
based on the arbitrator's 
recommendation. 
Lastly, Bliss argues the trial court erred 
by denying his rule 60(b) motion. When 
a trial court's denial of a rule 60(b) 
motion is appealed for anything other 
than lack of jurisdiction, this court 
reviews for an abuse of discretion. See 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. 
Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, P9, 2 P.3d 
451 . 
We conclude the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Bliss's 
motion under rule 60(b)(1). Bliss's 
argument that the trial court's 
confirmation of the arbitrator's award 
unjustly surprised him is unavailing. Bliss 
participated in the arbitration 
proceedings, was served with the 
arbitrator's ruling on September 1, 2000, 
and, as noted earlier, failed to file a 
motion to vacate the arbitrator's award 
within twenty days after the award was 
served on him as required by section 
78-31a-14. 
Bliss also claims the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying his motion under 
rule 60(b)(6) because his case qualifies 
as "any other reason to justify relief from 
the operation of the judgment." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(b)(6). However, because Bliss 
argues surprise under rule 60(b)(1), he 
cannot ask for relief under rule 60(b)(6). 
See Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons 
Co., 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). Additionally, rule 60(b)(6) "should 
be very cautiously and sparingly invoked 
by the Court only in unusual and 
exceptional instances." See id. The 
circumstances of this case are neither 
unusual nor exceptional. Therefore, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Bliss's motion under rule 
60(b)(6). 
In sum, although Bliss's appeal was 
timely filed, the trial court did not commit 
harmful error in confirming the 
arbitration decision nor abuse its 
discretion in denying his rule 60(b) 
motion. Accordingly, we affirm, award 
attorney fees incurred on appeal to Sky 
High, and remand to the trial court to 
determine the amount of reasonable 
attorney fees Sky High incurred on 
appeal.2 See Utah Dep'tofSoc. Servs. 
v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) ("When a party who 
received attorney fees below prevails on 
appeal, the party is also entitled to fees 
reasonably incurred on appeal.").3 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
William A. Thome Jr., Judge 
Footnotes 
Footnotes 
1 For purposes of this appeal, the 
relevant parts of Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provide: 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable 
neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or 
his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; . . .; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. 
2 Sky High was not awarded attorney 
fees as part of the arbitration award, but 
moved for and was granted attorney fees for 
the post-arbitration proceedings before the 
trial court. As noted earlier in this decision, 
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the amount of those fees was determined by 
an order entered on April 25, 2001. 
3 We reject Bliss's arguments that (1) the 
trial court committed reversible error by 
confirming the arbitrator's decision without 
first giving him notice of submission 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration; and (2) failure to 
conduct a trial on the merits of the 
mechanics' lien after the arbitration's 
conclusion deprived Bliss of due process of 
law. Both arguments are without merit. See 
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 
1992) (permitting appellate courts to 
summarily consider and rule on issues). 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and 
Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
We have determined that "the facts and 
legal arguments are adequately 
presented in the briefs and record and 
the decisional process would not be 
significantly aided by oral argument." 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
Defendants argue that the trial court 
abused its discretion by excluding the 
excerpts they offered from Marilyn 
Brenneman's deposition testimony. 1 "In 
general, trial courts have broad 
discretion in managing the cases 
assigned to their courts,' and we will not 
interfere with a trial court's case 
management unless its actions amount 
to an abuse of discretion.'" Maoris & 
Assocs. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 
P.2d 636, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(citation omitted). 
While it seems doubtful the trial court 
abused its discretion in this case, we 
need not conclusively decide whether 
the decision to exclude was erroneous 
because defendants have failed to show 
they were prejudiced by the exclusion. 
Even if a trial court erroneously excludes 
testimony, we will reverse only "if the 
error was prejudicial to the substantial 
rights of a party." Berrett v. Denver & Rio 
Grande W. R.R., 830 P.2d 291, 293 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1992). 
Having reviewed the entire Brenneman 
deposition, it is clear that the excluded 
portions would have made no difference 
in the final outcome of the trial. Prejudice 
is shown only if the presentation of the 
excluded evidence creates a 
"reasonable likelihood that . . . a different 
result would have eventuated." Id. 
(citation omitted). That is not the case 
here. The excluded portions of the 
Brenneman deposition simply confirm 
two facts which had already been 
presented by other witnesses: (1) that 
while living in Washington, plaintiff was 
convicted of a theft-related crime2 and 
(2) that during this same period he was 
involved in a shooting death for which he 
was never prosecuted. These same 
facts came out in the deposition 
testimony of Larry J. Peterson and 
during both defendant Howard 
Copelan's and plaintiffs testimony. The 
excluded testimony was largely 
cumulative and would have made no 
difference in the eventual outcome of the 
case. 
In addition, the excluded Brenneman 
deposition testimony, which only 
discusses limited events that occurred in 
Washington, was simply not relevant to 
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the numerous defamatory statements 
that defendants made concerning other 
alleged events that took place in 
Washington, nor to plaintiff's alleged 
misdeeds that happened after plaintiff 
moved to Wendover. There was ample 
evidence introduced at trial establishing 
these other defamatory statements, and 
they are more than sufficient to sustain 
the verdict against defendants. 
Therefore, regardless of whether the 
exclusion of Brenneman's deposition 
testimony was erroneous, defendants 
were not prejudiced. 
Affirmed. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Footnotes 
Footnotes 
1 Defendants adequately preserved this 
issue for appeal because they proffered the 
excluded, non-designated portions of the 
Brenneman deposition by reading it into the 
record. By contrast, defendants did not read 
into the record the excluded, non-designated 
portions of Larry J. Peterson's deposition. 
Without that testimony in the record, it is 
impossible to evaluate whether its exclusion 
was prejudicial. See Downey State Bank v. 
Major-BlakeneyCorp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 
(Utah 1978) ("A judgment will not be 
reversed for an alleged error in the exclusion 
of evidence unless it appears in the record 
that the error was prejudicial. [A party's] 
failure to make a proffer of proof as to what 
his evidence would show precludes him from 
asserting on appeal that the exclusion was 
error.")(footnote omitted). 
2 Plaintiff was involved in a bizarre scam 
in Washington that featured the unlikely 
sales combination of furniture and sexual 
favors. 
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Appellants Gerald L. McCurdy, Jason Stone, 
Richard Stone, Jerome C. Gatto, David 
McCurdy, Gerald Scott McCurdy, Timothy 
McCurdy, Jonathan McCurdy, and Terry 
Murray appeal a summary judgment and the 
ruling on their postjudgment motions under 
rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 1 Appellant Jerome Gatto also 
seeks to challenge a writ of execution. The 
court consolidated the two appeals. This 
case is before the court on Appellees' 
motion for summary disposition. 
The district court entered a final judgment on 
January 25, 2006, and an amended 
judgment on February 8, 2006. Defendant 
Clair Rogers, who is not a party to this 
appeal, filed a timely motion to amend the 
judgment or for a new trial. Under rule 4(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
the appeal time for all parties began to run 
on April 5, 2006, when the court entered its 
order resolving Rogers's timely motion to 
amend the judgment. See Utah R. App. P. 
4(b)(1) (providing that the time for appeal for 
all parties runs from the entry of an order 
disposing of a timely motion to amend the 
judgment). However, Appellants did not file 
their notice of appeal until July 28, 2006, 
more than thirty days after the entry of the 
order disposing of Rogers's motion. 
Because Appellants failed to file a timely 
appeal, "this court lacks jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal." Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 
2000 UT App 299, P7, 13P.3d616. Insofar 
as Appellants seek to challenge the 
summary judgment and amended judgment, 
we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of 
the appeal.2 
Appellants incorrectly assert that there was 
no final appealable judgment until entry of 
the July 18, 2006 order disposing of their 
motions made under rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. A rule 60(b) motion 
is not a motion that tolls the time for appeal 
from the final judgment under rule 4(b). See 
Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1). However, the ruling 
on such a motion is appealable. See Arnica 
Mut Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 970 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("It is well settled under 
Utah law [that] an order denying relief under 
[r]ule 60(b) is a final appealable order."). 
Such an appeal is limited to review of the 
ruling on the rule 60(b) motion and is not an 
appeal from the underlying judgment. See 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 
2000 UT App 110, P19, 2 P.3d 451 ("An 
appeal of a [r]ule 60(b) order addresses only 
the propriety of the denial or grant of relief 
[and does not] reach the merits of the 
underlying judgment from which relief is 
sought"). We reverse the district court's 
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ruling on a rule 60(b) motion only for an 
abuse of discretion. See id. at P9 . James Z. Davis, Judge 
The notice of appeal filed on July 28, 2006 
was timely filed after the July 18, 2006 order 
disposing of Appellants' postjudgment 
motions. The district court declined to rule 
on the postjudgment motions, stating that 
"the court finds [the motions] are essentially 
requesting reconsideration of prior rulings of 
the Court - something not provided for by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." See 
Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, P6, 135 P.3d 
861 ("[P]ost-judgment motions to reconsider 
are not recognized anywhere in either the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."); Ron 
Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 
653 n.4 (Utah 1994) ("[T]his court has 
consistently held that our rules do not 
provide for a motion for reconsideration of a 
trial court's order or judgment."). However, 
Appellants' pro se motions were captioned 
as motions to vacate the judgment, and they 
relied upon rule 60(b), in conjunction with 
rule 74(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as the basis for relief from the 
judgment. The district court abused its 
discretion by recharacterizing the motions as 
motions seeking reconsideration and 
declining to rule on the merits of the motions 
as they were framed by Appellants. 
Accordingly, we reverse the July 18, 2006 
minute entry order and remand to the district 
court for consideration of the motions under 
rule 60(b) and for entry of an order either 
granting or denying relief under that rule. 
In sum, we dismiss the appeal as untimely 
insofar as it seeks to directly appeal the 
summary judgment or amended judgment. 
This decision renders Appellant Jerome C. 
Gatto's appeal from the writ of execution on 
the summary judgment moot because that 
appeal did not state independent grounds for 
invalidity of the writ of execution. We reverse 
the ruling in the July 18, 2006 order declining 
to rule on postjudgment motions seeking 
relief under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision.3 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Footnotes 
Footnotes for Opinion 
1 The pro se notice of appeal is signed by 
each of the individual Appellants. We cannot 
construe the notice as initiating an appeal on 
behalf of Unique Minerals Inc. or Cambrillic 
Natural Stone L.L.C. 
2 Although Appellants refer to motions 
filed under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in their response, the record 
reflects that they did not file timely rule 59 
motions after entry of the January 25, 2006 
summary judgment or the February 8, 2006 
amended judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
59(b), (e) (requiring motions for new trial or 
to alter or amend to be filed or served "not 
later than 10 days after entry of the 
judgment"). 
3 We note that Appellants are now 
represented by counsel. Nothing in this 
decision should be construed to limit the 
district court's discretion to allow amendment 
of the previously filed rule 60(b) motions or 
other participation by counsel in proceedings 
on remand. 
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Donn Williams appeals from the district 
court's order confirming an arbitration award 
in favor of MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
Williams first argues that the district court 
erred in vacating its previous order granting 
summary judgment against MBNA. "A trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a 60(b) 
motion will not be overturned absent an 
abuse of discretion." Baker v. Western Sur. 
Co., 757 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
. Williams attempted to file his motion for 
summary judgment on December 13, 2004. 
In so doing, Williams served MBNA with the 
motion. However, the document was 
returned to him because it was filed in the 
wrong district. Williams refiled the summary 
judgment motion in the correct court on April 
26, 2005, but did not serve MBNA on this 
date. After the response period to the motion 
lapsed, Williams sought, and the trial court 
granted, an order for summary judgment. 
MBNA then learned of the order and filed a 
motion under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure to vacate the order, arguing 
unfair surprise or excusable neglect. 
Because MBNA did not receive service of 
the April 26, 2005 filing, it could not 
reasonably have anticipated that it needed to 
file a response to the motion within the time 
allotted by the rules of civil procedure. 
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in vacating the summary 
judgment order and allowing MBNA an 
opportunity to respond to the motion. 
Williams next argues that the district court 
erred in confirming the arbitration award 
because it failed to make any findings to 
justify the order. Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[i]n all 
actions tried upon facts without a jury or with 
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts 
specifically and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon." Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). Further, in many instances "[t]he 
failure of the trial court to enter adequate 
findings requires that the judgment be 
vacated." Anderson v. Utah County Bd. ol 
Comm'rs, 589 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1979). 
However, Utah Code section 78-31 a-123 
states: 
After a party to an arbitration proceeding 
receives notice of an award in a matter 
not pending before a court, the party 
may petition the court for an order 
confirming the award. . . . The court shall 
issue a confirming order unless the 
award was modified or corrected 
pursuant to [s]ection 78-31 a-121 or 
78-31 a-125 or is vacated pursuant to 
[s]ection 78-31 a-124 . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-123 (Supp. 
2006) (emphasis added). The statute, 
requiring the court to confirm the order, 
is mandatory. Accordingly, findings are 
not necessary when confirming an 
arbitration award. Therefore, the district 
court did not err in failing to make any 
findings of fact. 
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Affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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